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Rescue and personal involvement: a response to
Woollard
THERON PUMMER AND ROGER CRISP
Singer (1972) and Unger (1996) argue that widely shared intuitions about the
duty to assist in emergency cases support comparably stringent duties to aid
distant persons living in extreme poverty. In Part III of her ingenious book
Doing and Allowing Harm (2015), Fiona Woollard rejects their arguments,
claiming that while we are morally required to make substantial sacrifices to
aid others when personally involved in an emergency, as in Singer’s famous
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case in which you can pull a drowning child out of a pond, we are not so
required otherwise.
On the basis of a number of cases, Woollard argues that there are three
ways in which one could be personally involved in an emergency: by being
physically proximate to the victims of the emergency (proximity); by being
the only person who can help the victims (uniqueness); or by having a per-
sonal encounter with the victims (personal encounter). Each of these factors
is claimed to be intuitively defeasibly sufficient to ground personal involve-
ment, and thus a requirement of substantial sacrifice to aid. We show that
Woollard’s cases contain various confounding factors. In view of the more
precisely drawn cases we offer here, it is clear that neither proximity nor
uniqueness nor personal encounter is intuitively defeasibly sufficient in the
way Woollard claims.1
1. Proximity
Woollard’s argument for the sufficiency of proximity for personal involve-
ment revolves around two cases (2015: 134):
(Door) You learn from the radio that a child is drowning outside your
door. There are other people who could save the child, but none of them
are likely to do so.
(Distant Pond (Many Saviours)) You hear on the radio that a child is
drowning about 10 miles away. If he is not rescued, he will die. You
realize that you are able to save the child. There are many other people
who can help, but thus far no one looks likely to come forward.
According to Woollard’s intuitions, you are required to make a substantial
sacrifice to save the child in Door, but not the child in Distant Pond (Many
Saviours). On her view, a ‘substantial’ sacrifice might consist in paying $500
upfront (a means to aiding), or acting in a way that would result in the loss
of body parts or long-term financial security (side effects of aiding) (2015:
130–31).
As Woollard herself notes, it is important that her two cases differ with
respect to proximity only (2015: 133–34). Yet it is much easier to see how
aiding comes with risks to one’s bodily or financial security in Door than in
Distant Pond (Many Saviours). Further, in Door, there is a possibility that
one’s intuitions will be affected by views about special duties to assist those
on one’s property or within one’s community, and also by the tendency most
of us have to rush directly to aid those in urgent need. Consider, then, the
following cleaned-up variations on Woollard’s original cases:
1 We here focus on Woollard’s intuition-based arguments, presented in Chapter 7.
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(Nearby Pond (Many Saviours)) While out for a hike in a foreign land,
you hear on the radio that a child is drowning on the other side of a very
tall brick wall, about 10 metres away. If he is not rescued, he will die.
You cannot reach the child yourself, but realize that you are able to save
the child by paying $500 to activate a machine that will scoop him out
of the pond. There are many other people who can help, but thus far no
one looks likely to come forward.2
(Distant Pond (Many Saviours)*) Same as Nearby Pond (Many
Saviours), except here the child is about 10 miles away.
We do not find it intuitive that you are required to make a substantial
sacrifice to save the child in Nearby Pond (Many Saviours), but not the child
in Distant Pond (Many Saviours)*.3 Next consider:
(Nearby and Distant Ponds (Many Saviours)) While out for a hike in a
foreign land, you hear on the radio that six children are drowning on
the other side of a very tall brick wall, one child just 10 metres away, the
other five 10 miles away. If they are not rescued, they will die. You
cannot reach any child yourself, but realize that you are able to pay
$500 to save the nearby child, or instead to save the distant five. There
are many other people who can help, but thus far no one looks likely to
come forward.
We find it intuitive that you are required to pay $500 to save the distant
five rather than to save the nearby one. You are surely at least permitted to
pay $500 to save the distant five rather than to save the nearby one. This last
claim, however, is problematic for Woollard’s view. For on her view, when
we are required to aid the particular victims of emergencies in which we are
personally involved, we are intuitively not permitted instead to aid even a far
greater number of other victims with whom we are not so involved.4
These cases bring into focus the inability of physical proximity to ground
personal involvement, if, as Woollard claims, we are required to make sub-
stantial sacrifices when personally involved in an emergency, but not so
required otherwise.5
2 This case is inspired by Frances Kamm’s ‘Near Alone’ case (2007: 348).
3 At various points, Woollard indicates she has a nuanced understanding of proximity in
mind (2015: 135–36, 151–52). Although she does not develop this idea herself, she might
claim that, while the child in Nearby Pond (Many Saviours) is only 10 metres away, the
fact that he cannot be reached makes it the case that he is not proximate. We have more to
say on this point, but cannot say it here.
4 At (2015: 132) and elsewhere throughout Chapter 7 Woollard claims that the sacrifices
required when personally involved in emergencies are in this sense intuitively non-trans-
ferable, though in Chapter 8 (2015: 155–56) she briefly expresses doubts about this claim.
5 One might, on the basis of Nearby Pond (Many Saviours) and Distant Pond (Many
Saviours)*, claim that proximity is intuitively irrelevant. This is a controversial
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2. Uniqueness
Woollard begins by comparing Distant Pond (Many Saviours) with the fol-
lowing case (2015: 136):
(Distant Pond (Only Hope)) You hear on the radio that a child is
drowning about 10 miles away. If he is not rescued, he will die.
Unfortunately, specialized skills and equipment are needed to save the
child. Listening to the announcement, you realize that you are the only
one who could save him.
According to Woollard’s intuitions, you are required to make a substantial
sacrifice to save the child in Distant Pond (Only Hope), but not the child in
Distant Pond (Many Saviours).
Distant Pond (Only Hope) does not yield a proper comparison with
Distant Pond (Many Saviours). As with Door, intuitions about Distant
Pond (Only Hope) may be affected by our tendency to rush directly to aid
those in urgent need. Moreover, Distant Pond (Only Hope) may trigger in-
tuitions about professional duties (the reference to specialized skills and
equipment brings to mind activities such as cave-diving). What we need is
an (Only Hope) analogue of our Distant Pond (Many Saviours)*:
(Distant Pond (Only Hope)*) You hear on the radio that a child is
drowning about 10 miles away. If he is not rescued, he will die. You
cannot reach the child yourself, but realize that you are able to save the
child by paying $500. There is no one else who can help.
There is, however, a further issue here. Woollard’s Distant Pond (Only
Hope) is not made appropriately equivalent to Distant Pond (Many
Saviours), nor is our Distant Pond (Only Hope)* made appropriately equiva-
lent to Distant Pond (Many Saviours)*. The (Only Hope) cases are not made
appropriately equivalent to the (Many Saviours) cases with respect to the
child’s chance of surviving if you refrain from helping. The (Only Hope)
cases make it clear that if the child is not rescued, he will die, and that you
are the only person who can help, and hence certain that the child will die if
you refrain from helping. The (Many Saviours) cases, by contrast, state that
argumentative strategy – see Kamm 2007: 17–18, 347–49. To respond to Woollard, we need
claim only that our cases show that proximity is not intuitively defeasibly sufficient. If it is
not intuitive that you are required to make a substantial sacrifice in Nearby Pond (Many
Saviours) but not in Distant Pond (Many Saviours)*, then to defend her position Woollard
must argue that our cases introduce some defeating condition (that prevents the difference
with respect to proximity from making the moral difference it otherwise would). But we
do not see how our cases do this, and nothing Woollard says suggests they would. The
same remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to our cases involving uniqueness and personal
encounter.
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many other people can help but thus far no one looks likely to come forward.
To make the cases appropriately equivalent, we need a further case:
(Distant Pond (Many Saviours, Certainty)) You hear on the radio that a
child is drowning about 10 miles away. If he is not rescued, he will die.
You cannot reach the child yourself, but realize that you are able to save
the child by paying $500. There are others who can help, but you are
certain they will not.
In this case, you are still the child’s only hope in that you are the only
person he has any hope of being rescued by. But you are not unique in
Woollard’s sense. We do not find it intuitive that you are required to make
a substantial sacrifice to save the child in Distant Pond (Only Hope)*, but not
the child in Distant Pond (Many Saviours, Certainty). Moreover, as with
Nearby and Distant Ponds (Many Saviours), it seems hard to believe it
would not be permissible to save five children in a situation like that of the
child in Distant Pond (Many Saviours, Certainty) when you could instead
save one child in a situation like that of the child in Distant Pond (Only
Hope)*.
These cases bring into focus the inability of uniqueness to ground personal
involvement.
3. Personal encounter
Woollard begins with the following case (2015: 127) (based on Unger
1996: 39):
(Wealthy Drivers) Over your CB radio, you hear the pleas of a man. He
has a major wound in his leg. As he has had medical training, he can tell
you that if he does not get to the hospital soon, he is almost certain to
lose it. If you help the man, your car will sustain $5,000 worth of
damage. Three other drivers are also in radio contact. Each of the
others is nearer to the man and far wealthier than you. But, as each
of the three complain, she doesn’t want to get involved.
Woollard’s intuition is that you are required to make a substantial sacrifice
to help the man, even though you are not near to him and not the only person
who can help him. The crucial factor here, Woollard claims, is personal
encounter. It seems clear that there is a personal encounter between you
and the child in Singer’s classic pond case. It may be less clear how you
also have a personal encounter with the man in Wealthy Drivers. On this,
Woollard writes:
I also think there is a personal encounter in the Wealthy Drivers case:
the victim appeals to you over the CB radio . . . An appeal over a CB
radio, unlike an appeal over a standard radio, is the beginning of a two-
rescue and personal involvement | 63
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/analysis/article-abstract/80/1/59/5570303 by U
niversity of St Andrew
s user on 30 January 2020
way conversation . . . Being part of a conversation with someone is
enough to count as having a personal encounter. (2015: 137)
We believe that Wealthy Drivers is insufficiently cleaned up to enable a
proper test of the intuitive moral relevance of personal encounter. Wealthy
Drivers brings in the ‘rushing directly to aid’ factor to which we already
called attention in our discussions of proximity and uniqueness.
Furthermore, intuitions here are likely affected by the thought that you at
least have a duty to respond to the man over the CB radio (apart from any
duty you may also have to make a substantial sacrifice to aid him), and the
likelihood that, once you start talking to him, you’ll get yourself on the hook
to do more by promising him that you are on your way. It seems likely you’d
want to say something to reassure him, and feel pressured to tell him you are
on the way, in response to his frantic cries for help.
We need to remove these potentially confounding factors, using a case in
which personal encounter is present but otherwise matches Distant Pond
(Many Saviours)*. To that end, we offer a version of the latter involving a
CB radio rather than a standard one:
(Distant Pond (Many Saviours, CB Radio)) Over your CB radio, you
hear the pleas of a child who is drowning about 10 miles away. If he is
not rescued, he will die. You cannot reach the child yourself, but realize
that you are able to save the child by paying $500. However, the only
way to pay the $500 is by switching off your CB radio immediately, as if
left on it would (we can suppose) prevent the life-saving payment from
going through. There are many other people who can help, but thus far
no one looks likely to come forward.
We do not find it intuitive that you are required to make a substantial
sacrifice to save the child in Distant Pond (Many Saviours, CB Radio) but not
the child in Distant Pond (Many Saviours)*. Moreover, as with Nearby and
Distant Ponds (Many Saviours), it seems hard to believe it would not be
permissible to save five children in a situation like that of the child in
Distant Pond (Many Saviours)* when you could instead save one child in
a situation like that of the child in Distant Pond (Many Saviours, CB Radio).
These cases bring into focus the inability of personal encounter to ground
personal involvement.
4. Other factors
We have argued that Woollard’s cases do not provide a sound intuitive basis
for claiming that proximity, uniqueness and personal encounter are each
defeasibly sufficient to ground personal involvement, where the latter is
understood to ground a requirement of substantial sacrifice to aid that we
would not otherwise have. Does this mean we must accept the arguments by
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Singer and Unger that intuitions about the duty to assist in emergency cases
support comparably stringent duties to aid distant persons living in extreme
poverty? No. There are other differences between Singer’s pond case and the
case in which you can save a life by giving to charity. For all we’ve argued,
some of them are morally relevant (see Mogensen 2019).
Finally, perhaps we are not required to save lives whenever we can do so
‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’
(Singer 1972: 231). Consider:
(Never-Ending Ponds) Young children are constantly falling into ponds
in your country. You cannot go out for a walk without running across a
child drowning in a pond. You’ve saved many drowning children, at
substantial cost to yourself. Today when you see a child drowning in a
pond, surrounded by other potential saviours all doing nothing, you just
keep walking. (Woollard 2015: 126)
Woollard writes that the agent here:
. . . is not required to make substantial sacrifices every single time. When
the agent has already made substantial sacrifices in a number of cases or
anticipates being required to do so in the future, the agent may refuse to
help in a given case. (Woollard 2015: 131)6
If this is correct, we can avoid Singeresque conclusions without appealing
to the moral relevance of factors such as proximity, uniqueness or personal
encounter.7
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6 Others would agree. For example, Cullity (2004) and Timmerman (2015).
7 We are grateful to Fiona Woollard, the Editors of and referees for Analysis, and audiences
at the University of Edinburgh, the University of St Andrews and Stockholm University.
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Plenty of room left for the Dogmatist
THOMAS RALEIGH
1. Cartesian vs. Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification
Barnett (2019) provides an interesting new challenge against Dogmatist1 ac-
counts of perceptual justification. For present purposes, the Dogmatist’s key
claim is the denial of the following ‘Cartesian’2 thesis:
(Perceptual Incredulism) One is never justified in believing what one per-
ceives unless one has independent evidence that one’s perceptual experi-
ences are reliable.
To deny Incredulism is to allow that (some) experiences can provide (some
degree of) justification even if you have no independent evidence that they are
reliable.
The Cartesian and the Dogmatist also disagree over the relative importance
of one’s own experiences compared with other peoples’ experiences. The
Cartesian accepts the following:
(Perceptual Impartiality) Having a perceptual experience can never give
you substantially stronger justification for a perceptual belief than you
would get from knowing that another person has had such an
experience.
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1 The label ‘Dogmatism’ is due to Jim Pryor’s seminal ‘The skeptic and the dogmatist’
(2000).
2 Barnett generally uses the labels ‘Cartesian’ vs. ‘Anti-Cartesian’ – Dogmatism is then
counted as one form of Anti-Cartesianism, whilst Epistemological Disjunctivism (e.g.
McDowell 1994, Pritchard 2012) is another kind of Anti-Cartesianism.
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